Is Basel II Procyclical?
One theory of the cosmos holds that the Universe is currently in the midst of a rapid expansion. One day (billions of years from now, I hope) it will crash back onto itself. The crashed Universe would then take the form of a singularity, Big Bang its way back into another expansion, and then collapse again.
Sounds a bit like our financial markets doesn’t it?
The bubble, crash, repeat cycle of the economy is starting to take its toll, and many are wondering what can be done to stem this unhealthy process. Regulation appears to be one solution, and the international banking community points to the Basel II accord as a framework to better manage capital adequacy and market, operational and credit risk—curbing the boom/bust cycle.
This may be so, and Basel II is no doubt an upgrade over the original Basel Accord, but many critics counter explanations of benefits with cries of “procyclicity”. Procyclicity is the exaggeration of upturns and downturns caused by tenets of, in this case at least, a piece of regulatory policy.
The inherent purpose of Basel II is to aid regulators in determining the appropriate amount capital banks must hold in reserve. The amount of capital cushion necessary is determined by the riskiness of a bank’s lending and investment practices. This is all well and good in boom cycles where assets are perceived and rated to be less risky than they really are (see CDOs), but in a “black swan” scenario, like the credit crunch, things can very quickly go from bad to much, much worse.
Critics point to the fact that capital requirements regulations like Basel II force banks to raise capital when the creditworthiness of their loans and investments are downgraded. Thus, when millions of subprime-mortgages and their derived securities go from high to junk ratings, banks are pushed to sell assets, issue stock, and seek cash infusions from the government. Banks are also less likely to issue new loans (more loans equals more cash needed), hindering economic growth and recovery.
Sounds depressing (literally), but it is important to remember that the root of procyclicity is low capitalization and poor risk management. In credit crunch-like situations, undercapitalized banks are forced to make rash decisions, and cutting lending is usually one such decision. Basel II works to improve risk detection and pushes for the development of early-warning systems, allowing these banks to build up adequate capital before a crunch occurs. Basel II also calls for banks to conduct “stress tests”, measuring capital adequacy in various economic scenarios.
The bottom line is that though it may have some procyclical attributes, Basel II is a regulatory upgrade which will provide a more stringent capital adequacy and risk management framework to the banking industry. It is also still a work in progress, and in late July the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and International Organization of Securities Commissions proposed a serious of fixes to improve the regulations. In next week’s blog entry, I’ll discuss these reforms and their potential impacts on the banking industry.
For in-depth analyses of other Governance, Risk and Compliance issues, check out our GRC edition of FINsights.



Comments
This is a topic resonating in various risk forums across globe since the publication of first draft of Basel II accord way back in 2004. To me, the resolution lies in the guideline itself.
Basel II has given enough room for banks to utilise advanced models created internally and also reinforced to stress/back test those periodically. Now, the challenge is in the model governance and hence adequate capital allocation. Banks have the facility to provide model parameters where they can have surplus regulatory capital reserve at the time of market expansion and those surplus can be utilised during recession. This looks logical, but sounds tough on implementation. However, with strong stress and back testing culture, banks can definitely sharpen their model validations & improvisation process which helps in efficient regulatory capital determination and in sub-siding the fear of pro-cyclicality.
Posted by: Suvendu | September 3, 2008 3:15 AM
Well! Basel II can save banks if they are able to calculate risk for their products in a well defined manner.
However, Basel II can't be effective if a bank makes risk calculation opaque and can't measure it. This is what has happened in the current financial crunch.
The Investment Bankers became so greedy for 8 digit bonuses and 4 digit wine bottle evenings that they didn't realize that they have created Bhasmasur which destructed themselves.
Any financial product's complexity should not become so complex that even the best minds can't measure the risk involved.
If you can't measure risk honestly and accurately and indulge in selling product just for money, I don't think even God can save you, leave Basel II.
Second, If you see Capital Adequcy Ratio of failed financial institutions, it was less than 3%, which should be 8% by Basel II norms.
ALso, I would like to end on the note that there is no instrument or guideline yet defined by humans which can prevent from dangers emanating from greed.
Posted by: Santosh Singh | October 14, 2008 8:48 AM